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Brown: Piedmont Environmental Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commi
PIEDMONT ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL V. FEDERAL ENERGYREGULATORY
COMMISSION

In Piedmont Environmental Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
a statute allowing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to issue
permits for the construction of new electrical transmission facilities where state
commissions have "'withheld approval [of a permit application] for more than 1
year"' does not apply in cases where the state authority simply denies a permit
application.2
Until 2005, the electrical transmission systems distributing power
throughout the United States were entirely a product of state regulation.3 In
particular, state commissions exercised exclusive authority to issue permits for
the siting and construction of new electrical transmission facilities.4 With the
Energy Policy Act of 20055 (EPAct), however, Congress empowered FERC to
exercise "backstop" siting authority, allowing the federal government to
supplement state
regulators in issuing permits for new transmission
6
infrastructure. The Act envisions a robust federal power-coupling its
permitting authority with a right of eminent domain7-but limits its use to
certain narrowly defined circumstances. s Among those circumstances is the
situation where a state has "withheld approval for more than 1 year." 9 The
10
primary question presented in Piedmont was the precise scope of this authority.
FERC issued a final rule on November 16, 2006,11 as required by the
EPAct, 12 in which it set forth its understanding of the scope of its backstop
authority in the broadest possible terms. 13 Under this interpretation, FERC's
power to award permits where a state has "withheld approval for more than 1

1. 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. Edison Elec. Inst. v. Piedmont Envtl.
Council, No. 09-343, 2010 WL 154946 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2010).
2.
Id. at 309-10 (alteration in original). This Summary will focus on the court's core
holding about the scope of FERC's permitting jurisdiction, but the court also held that FERC "was
not required to prepare an environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement" in
issuing regulations governing the content of permit applications, that FERC should have consulted
with the Council on Environmental Quality in issuing its National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) implementing regulations for such permit applications, and that a challenge to the content
of"FERC's NEPA-implementing regulations" was accordingly unripe. Id. at 310.

3.
4.
5.
6.
(2006)).
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 310 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 824p(a), 824p(b), 824p(b)(1)(C)(i)
16 U.S.C. § 824p(e)(1).
See id. § 824p(b).
Id. § 824p(b)(1)(C)(i).
See Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 309-10.
Id. at311.
16 U.S.C. § 824p(c)(2).

13. See Regulations for Filing Applications for Permits to Site Interstate Electric
Transmission Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 69,440, 69,444-45 (Dec. 1, 2006).
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year" includes not only cases where the state "fails to act," but also where it
"rejects" or "deni[es]" an application. 14 In so concluding, FERC rejected input
submitted by parties during the comment period that the phrase "withheld
approval for more than 1 year" not be interpreted to confer jurisdiction where a
state simply denies an application. 15 One commissioner, Suedeen G. Kelly,
penned a vigorous dissent to FERC's final rule, arguing that by forcing states
either to approve a permit or relinquish authority to the federal government, the
announced rule amounted to "preemption" of state jurisdiction without an
adequate basis in the statutory text.
The four petitioners in Piedmont-Piedmont Environmental Council
(Piedmont), the Public Service Commission of the State of New York, the
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, and Communities Against Regional
17
Interconnect-each requested rehearing on the final rule, which FERC denied.
Piedmont filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit.18 The remaining
parties filed similar petitions in the Second Circuit and D.C. Circuit. 19 The courts
transferred their 20cases to the Fourth Circuit, and the cases were consolidated with
Piedmont's suit.
All three members of the Fourth Circuit panel agreed that the scope of
FERC's backstop authority was a matter of statutory interpretation to be
determined with reference to Chevron USA., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense
Council.21 The petitioners had argued for a more complex analysis, reasoning
that because the EPAct intruded upon a realm of traditional state authority, the
court should apply a presumption against preemption and require a clear
statement of congressional intent to supplement state authority with overlapping
federal jurisdiction.22 Judge Michael, writing for the majority, disagreed.
Where it is clear that Congress intended to intercede in an area of preexisting
state regulation and the only question is the scope of that federal authority, then,
according to Judge Michael, New York v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission24 requires the court to interpret the statute "without any presumption
one way or the other" in order "to determine whether Congress has given [the

14. Id.
15. Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 310. Indeed, of the fifty-one letters received during the comment
period, not one argued in favor of FERC's expansive interpretation. Regulations for Filing
Applications for Permits to Site Interstate Electric Transmission Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. at 69,476
(Kelly, Comm'r, dissenting in part).
16. Regulations for Filing Applications for Permits to Site Interstate Electric Transmission
Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. at 69,476.
17. Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 311.
18. Id. at 312.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984));
id. at 321 (Traxler, J., dissenting).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
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agency] the power to act as it has." 25 Presented, then, with a straightforward task
of reviewing an agency's interpretation of law, Judge Michael invoked
Chevron's two-step inquiry: first, "whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue," and second, if the statute is not clear, "whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 26
The majority held that FERC's interpretation was "contrary to the plain
meaning of the statute" and thus failed under the first step of Chevron.27 Judge
Michael embarked on a relatively searching inquiry at this first step, consulting
not only "'the language itself,"' but also "'the specific context in28which that
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole."'
Relying on a Webster's Dictionary definition of the term "withhold" and its
context in the statute, Judge Michael reasoned that FERC's interpretation did not
fit the plain language of the statute. 29 The phrase "withheld approval for more
than 1 year" implies the notion "that action has been held back continuously over
a period of time. '30 Denial, by contrast, "is a final act that stops the running of
time during which approval was withheld on a pending application." 31 It would
be "nonsensical," then, to conceive of situations where a state has "denied
approval.., for more than 1 year" because "the final nature of 'denied' conflicts
with the continuing nature of 'for more than 1 year."'' 32 Judge Michael
acknowledged that both Webster's Dictionary and Roget's International
Thesaurus suggest an alternative definition of "deny" is sometimes "withhold,"
but he found that this did not make the terms interchangeable in the statute.3 3 A
denial may take many forms-including the withholding of approval-but that
does not mean that every denial necessarily constitutes a withholding.34
Judge Michael argued further that the broader statutory scheme indicated
congressional intent to confer "only a measured, although important, transfer of
jurisdiction to FERC. ' 35 Critically, FERC's backstop authority is limited to "a
carefully drawn list of five circumstances," which apply only where (1) the state
regulator lacks authority to approve the siting, (2) the state regulator lacks
authority to consider interstate benefits of the proposed facility, (3) the applicant
cannot qualify for a permit under state law because the proposed facility "does

25. Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 312 (alteration in original) (quoting New York, 535 U.S. at 18)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Id.(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Id.at 313-15.
28. Id.at 312-13 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).
29. Id.at 313 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2627 (2002)).

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.(emphasis omitted).

33. Id.(citing

WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

603, 2627 (2002); ROGET'S INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS

776.4 (4th ed. 1984)).

34. Id.("The word 'deny' is broad enough to include 'withhold' in its definition, but the
word 'withhold' is not broad enough to include 'deny' in its definition.").
35. Id.at 314.
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not serve end-use customers in [the] state," (4) the state regulator has withheld
approval for more than one year (the provision at issue in Piedmont), or (5) the
state regulator has approved the facility but imposed conditions that render it
either economically infeasible or incapable of reducing transmission congestion
36
in interstate commerce. Setting aside the withholding of approval circumstance
at issue in Piedmont, each of the other four circumstances represents a "limited
grant[] of jurisdiction" intended to allow the federal government to step in "only
when a state commission either is unable to act or acts inappropriately by
including project-killing conditions. 37 FERC's interpretation of the "withheld
approval" language, however, would make it "futile for a state commission to
deny a permit based on traditional considerations like cost and benefit, land use
and environmental impacts, and health and safety"-effectively constituting a
broad preemption of state38 jurisdiction "completely out of proportion" with the
other four circumstances.
The majority also addressed the clause in light of two potentially
problematic provisions of the EPAct statutory scheme. First, the "withheld
approval" language of 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(1)(C)(i) is paired with subsection
(b)(1)(C)(ii), which confers federal jurisdiction in cases where the state regulator
has "conditioned its approval in such a manner that the proposed construction or
modification will not significantly reduce transmission congestion in interstate
commerce or is not economically feasible., 39 These two subsections should be
read in a logically consistent way, but that raises the question of why Congress
would provide a mechanism for FERC to overrule state regulatory authority in
cases of overly onerous conditions but not of outright denial. 40 Judge Michael
answered that "[w]hen a state commission grants approval with project-killing
conditions, it misuses its authority, and the state licensing system has failed,"
justifying FERC's interposition of federal jurisdiction. 4 1 When a state denies an
application, by contrast, "it acts with transparency and engages in a legitimate
use of its traditional powers." 42 The second important provision of the EPAct
provides for three or more states to enter into interstate compacts for the purpose
of regulating electricity transmission facilities; in addition, it forecloses FERC's
backstop authority over decisions by such interstate agencies unless two
conditions are met: (1) "members of the compact are in disagreement" and (2)
"the Secretary makes ... the finding described in subsection (b)(1)(C)" 43 -to
wit, that the agency either has withheld approval for more than one year or else

36.
(2006)).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 313-14 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 824p(1)(A)(i)-(ii), 824p(1)(B), 824p(1)(C)(i)-(ii)
Id. at 314.
Id.
16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(1)(C)(ii).
See Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 314.
Id.
Id. at 314-15.
16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(1)(C).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol61/iss3/15

4

Brown: Piedmont Environmental Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commi
2010]

PIEDMONT ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL V. FERC

conditioned approval on project-killing conditions. 44 As the dissent pointed out,
this poses an important question of why Congress would carve out a special
provision to shield the decisions of interstate compact agencies from federal
jurisdiction if an individual state regulator could block that jurisdiction simply
by denying an application.45 Judge Michael responded that the interstate compact
provision offers additional insulation to interstate agencies in a different way: if
an interstate compact agency delays action on a project for more than one year or
imposes project-killing conditions-unambiguously fulfilling subsection
(b)(1)(C)--FERC still may not intercede
unless the states comprising the
46
interstate compact are in disagreement.
Judge Traxler, writing in dissent, contended that the plain meaning of
"withheld approval for more than 1 year" includes denial of approval and thus
that FERC's interpretation should prevail at the first stage of the court's Chevron
inquiry. 47 Here Judge Traxler disputed both the majority's reading of the plain
language of the statute and its interpretation of the broader statutory scheme. 48
Alternatively, he argued that FERC's interpretation is "reasonable
at the very
49
least, and therefore entitled to deference under Chevron."
In terms of the statute's plain meaning, Judge Traxler argued that a state has
"withheld approval for more than 1 year" any time a full year elapses after
approval is sought and "the state still has not granted it, regardless of the
reason." 50 Contrary to the majority's analysis, he argued, the word "withhold" is
not interchangeable with the word "denied" because denial of an application is
not a legally consequential event under the statute.51 He explained that "denial
does not constitute the withholding of approval" but rather is "merely one event
that may 52
occur during the more-than-one-year period in which approval is
withheld.
Judge Traxler also criticized the majority's understanding of the broader
statutory scheme embodied in EPAct's various backstop authority provisions. 53
The notion that Congress meant to confer only certain "limited grants of
jurisdiction,, 54 according to the dissent, is belied by the sweeping nature of
subsection (b)(1)(C)(ii), which allows FERC "essentially [to] 'trump' the states'
permitting decisions.., when a state grants a permit under conditions FERC
determines to be unreasonable., 55 In contrast to the majority's relatively narrow

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.§§ 824p(i)(1), (4).
Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 323-24 (Traxler, J., dissenting).
Id.at 315 n.2 (majority opinion).
See id.at 326 (Traxler,J.,
dissenting).
See id. at 321-25.
Id.at 326.
Id.at 322.
See id.at 322-23.
Id.
See id.at 323-25.
Id.at 314 (majority opinion).
Id.at 323 (Traxler, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
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reading, the dissent found that subsection (b)(1)(C)(ii)'s references to conditions
that "'will not significantly reduce transmission congestion"' or that are "'not
economically feasible"' allow FERC to overrule a state's decision "based on
simple differences of opinion between FERC and the state regarding the impact
of the conditions imposed., 56 Given the breadth of such power "to 'trump' states
when they thwart the goal of significantly reducing transmission congestion...
by granting permits subject to conditions FERC determines to be unreasonable,"
Judge Traxler concluded that it "makes no sense.., in light of the purpose of the
legislation" to suppose that Congress meant to preserve state jurisdiction "when
states thwart the same goal by denying the permits outright.""7
Finally, Judge Traxler argued that the interstate cornact provision of
subsection (i) is incompatible with the majority's holding. If Congress had
meant to allow a single state's denial of an application to be final and to block
FERC's backstop authority-as the majority held-then it would make little
sense to require multiple states in an interstate compact to be unanimous in
denying an application in order to foreclose the federal jurisdiction.59
Piedmont not only provides an example of a closely reasoned and relatively
searching inquiry at the first stage of the Chevron analysis, but it also illustrates
some of the difficulties in applying Chevron's analytic framework. The linguistic
arguments of both the majority opinion and the dissent fall short in ascertaining
whether Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at issue" and
whether "the intent of Congress is clear. 60 Rather, the two sides justify their
views on the basis of competing conceptions of the statutory scheme that, in the
end, seem to reflect policy judgments about the proper balance of federal and
state authority to site electrical transmission facilities.
Judge Michael's textual analysis addresses arguments made in FERC's
appellate brief6 1 but never engages with Judge Traxler's contention that denial of
an application is simply irrelevant to the question of whether a state has
"withheld approval for more than 1 year." The dissent envisions a binary
conception of the meaning of "withhold"--that a state regulator either grants
approval or withholds it62-that seems faithful to the dictionary definition cited
63
by the majority. The dissent's view is compelling on an intuitive level: if one
heard that a state had decided not to withhold approval of a permit application,

56. Id.at 323-24 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(1)(C)(ii) (2006)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 324 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i)).
59. Id.
60. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
61. Brief of Respondent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission at 16-17, Piedmont Envtl.
Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-1651) (arguing that "the term 'deny' is
synonymous with 'withhold"').
62. See Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 322-23.
63. Id. at 313 (majority opinion) (defining "withhold" as 'to desist or refrain from granting,
giving, or allowing"' (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2627
(2002)).
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one would assume that the state had approved the application instead; it would
be difficult to conclude from such phrasing that the state, in fact, had denied the
application. Moreover, Congress's choice of the words "withheld approval,"
rather than "withheld action" or "withheld decision," suggests that it
contemplated a binary construct of approval or no approval, lending further
support to Judge Traxler's reading of "withheld." The plain text of the statute
thus either supports the dissent's view or, at best, is ambiguous: the fact that two
judges "found that the relevant statutory text is clear, but in diametrically
opposed directions," suggests a certain measure of ambiguity. 64 Given the
weakness of the linguistic argument, then, the outcome of the case rests on
competing visions of how the EPAct works as a whole.
Both sides focus on harmonizing their views of the "withheld approval"
language with the structural scheme of the statute, but the dissent's reliance on
the interstate compact provision, 65 in particular, is misplaced. Judge Traxler
seems to have in mind one specific example: where an application is denied,
either unanimously or with at least one member state in disagreement. 66 Under
the majority's holding, a denial by an interstate compact agency does not trigger
FERC's backstop authority, no matter what the voting posture. For the dissent,
this renders meaningless the requirement that "members of the compact [be] in
disagreement" before FERC can exercise jurisdiction" and undermines any
69
incentive for states to enter into such compacts. Of course, as the majority
points out, this line of argument ignores the other possible scenarios where a
single state's action would trigger federal jurisdiction, but the same action taken
by an interstate compact agency, acting on the unanimous consent of its member
states, would not trigger federal jurisdiction: either where no action at all is taken
for more than one year or where approval is granted but tied to project-killing
conditions.7 0
The lynchpin of the case is thus the relationship between subsections
(b)(1)(C)(i) and (ii). For Judge Michael's majority, subsection (ii) confers a
relatively narrow basis for federal jurisdiction-available only where a state
regulator "misuses its authority" in imposing "project-killing" conditions. 71
Given the narrowness of these circumstances, the majority reasons, it makes

64. Debbie Swanstrom & Meredith M. Jolivert, Doe Transmission CorridorDesignations&
FERC Backstop Siting Authority: Has the Energy Policy Act of 2005 Succeeded in Stimulating the
Development of New TransmissionFacilities?,30 ENERGY L.J. 415, 450 (2009) (quoting Petition of
Respondent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for Rehearing En Bane, Piedmont, 558 F.3d
304 (No. 07-1651)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. See Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 324 (Traxler, J., dissenting).
66. See id.
67. Id. at 315 n.2 (majority opinion).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i)(4) (2006).
69. See Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 324 (Traxler, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 315 n.2 (majority opinion).
71. Id. at 314. The majority contrasted this with outright denial, which is a "legitimate use of
[a state's] traditional powers." Id. at 315.
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little sense to read subsection (i) so broadly as to confer federal jurisdiction
every time a state denies a permit application. The implication seems to be that
it triggers federal jurisdiction only in the relatively rare situations where a state
misuses its authority; the federal government merely stands in reserve as a
guarantor of "transparency" and "legitima[cy]" in the state regulatory process. 73
But the same formulation might be turned on its head: if a state imposes
conditions that "will not significantly reduce transmission congestion" or are
"not economically feasible, 74 then, by definition, the state has misused its
authority-a notion that paradoxically seems to narrow the range of discretion a
state may legitimately exercise. In the end, though, Judge Michael seems to
conceive of the EPAct as an action-forcing mechanism, prodding states to take
action in a timely and reasonable manner, but reserving the bulk of regulatory
authority to the states.
For Judge Traxler, by contrast, subsection (ii) confers very broad discretion:
FERC may exercise its backstop authority on the basis of a mere policy
disagreement with a state over the practical or economic effects of an approval
condition. This interpretation rested on a vision of the statutory scheme as a
mechanism not so much to fine-tune the state regulatory process as to supplant it,
telling states, in the words of Commissioner Kelly, "[e]ither issue a permit, or
we'll do it for them., 75 Judge Traxler emphasized the advantages of FERC's
"broader national perspective" in making permit decisions and the importance of
preventing states from "frustrat[ing] the goal of significantly reducing
transmission congestion,, 76 indicating a vision of federal authority as
qualitatively different from state authority, motivated by a more catholic concern
for the needs of an interconnected electricity distribution system. FERC's
authority thus overlaps with the legitimate authority of the states in the context
of subsection (ii); accordingly, it makes sense for FERC's 7authority
to overlap
7
with that of the states in the context of subsection (i) as well.
Piedmont illustrates the problem of resolving a case like this under the
Chevron framework. Both the majority's and the dissent's visions of the
purposes of the statute-with federal authority either carefully counterbalancing
the authority of the states or else partially overlapping it-are internally coherent
and offer acceptable interpretations of the overall statutory scheme. The
argument ultimately boils down to competing views of what Congress intended
the balance between the federal government and states to be, but the

72.
73.
74.
75.
Facilities,
76.
77.

Id. at 314.
See id. at 314-15.
Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(1)(C)(ii) (2006)).
Regulations for Filing Applications for Permits to Site Interstate Electric Transmission
71 Fed. Reg. 69,440, 69,476 (Dec. 1, 2006) (Kelly, Comm'r, dissenting in part).
Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 323-24 (Traxler, J., dissenting).
See id.
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647

stands in
susceptibility of the statutory framework to differing interpretations
78
tension with the idea that "the intent of Congress is clear.,
ChristopherBrown

78.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
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